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THE	  ELEPHANT	  ALWAYS	  FORGETS:	  
TAX	  REFORM	  AND	  THE	  WTO	  
	  
Reuven	  S.	  Avi-­‐Yonah	  





The	  “Tax	  Cuts	  and	  Jobs	  ACT”	  (TCJA)	  enacted	  on	  December	  22,	  2017,	  includes	  several	  
provisions	  that	  raise	  WTO	  compliance	  issues.	  At	  least	  one	  such	  provision,	  the	  
Foreign-­‐Derived	  Intangible	  Income	  (FDII)	  rule,	  is	  almost	  certain	  to	  draw	  a	  challenge	  
in	  the	  WTO	  and	  is	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  another	  US	  loss	  and	  resulting	  sanctions.	  This	  
outcome	  would	  be	  another	  addition	  to	  the	  repeated	  losses	  suffered	  by	  the	  US	  for	  
export	  subsidies	  from	  the	  1970s	  to	  2004,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  imposition	  of	  sanctions	  
and	  the	  ultimate	  repeal	  of	  the	  offending	  regime.	  The	  important	  question	  for	  2018	  
and	  beyond	  is	  whether	  the	  Trump	  administration	  and	  its	  Congressional	  allies	  will	  
react	  to	  such	  a	  loss	  in	  a	  similar	  fashion	  as	  the	  Bush	  administration	  did	  in	  2004,	  or	  
whether	  it	  will	  defy	  the	  WTO,	  with	  potential	  far	  reaching	  consequences	  for	  the	  
world	  trade	  order.	  
	  
1. Introduction:	  Tax	  and	  Trade	  
	  
From	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  world	  trade	  regime,	  it	  has	  been	  clear	  that	  tax	  laws	  can	  
undermine	  the	  proper	  functioning	  of	  trade	  rules	  in	  two	  main	  ways.	  First,	  
taxes	  can	  serve	  as	  tariff	  barriers	  if	  they	  are	  imposed	  on	  imports	  but	  not	  on	  
domestic	  sales.	  Second,	  remission	  of	  taxes	  on	  exports	  can	  serve	  as	  an	  export	  
subsidy.1	  	  
	  
The	  first	  type	  of	  tax	  measure	  violates	  GATT	  II:1(b)	  because	  it	  is	  an	  
unscheduled	  charge	  on	  importation	  that	  is	  not	  an	  “ordinary	  customs	  duty.”	  	  
Alternatively,	  if	  the	  tax	  is	  imposed	  on	  importers	  but	  not	  on	  domestic	  sellers,	  
it	  can	  be	  found	  to	  violate	  GATT	  III:2	  as	  a	  discriminatory	  internal	  tax.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See	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  Issues	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  L.	  1683	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  Tax,	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  Controversy,	  21	  Tax	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The	  second	  type	  of	  tax	  measure	  violates	  the	  Subsidies	  and	  Countervailing	  
Measures	  Agreement	  (“SCM	  Agreement”),	  which	  applies	  to	  goods	  but	  not	  to	  
services.	  Article	  1	  of	  the	  SCM	  Agreement	  defines	  a	  subsidy	  as	  a	  financial	  
contribution	  by	  a	  government	  conferring	  a	  benefit,	  which	  includes:	  the	  direct	  
transfers	  of	  funds,	  goods	  or	  services	  (other	  than	  infrastructure),	  and	  the	  non-­‐
collection	  or	  forgiveness	  of	  taxes	  otherwise	  due.	  The	  SCM	  Agreement	  
distinguishes	  three	  categories	  of	  subsidies:	  prohibited	  subsidies,	  non-­‐
actionable	  subsidies,	  and	  actionable	  subsidies.	  The	  prohibited	  subsidies	  
category,	  described	  in	  Article	  3	  of	  the	  SCM	  Agreement,	  includes:	  	  
	  
a. Subsidies	  that	  are	  contingent,	  in	  law	  or	  in	  fact,	  upon	  export	  
performance,	  and	  
	  
b.	   Subsidies	  that	  are	  contingent	  upon	  the	  use	  of	  domestic	  over	  imported	  
goods.	  	  	  
	  
These	  subsidies	  are	  prohibited	  outright	  and	  countries	  are	  allowed	  to	  
unilaterally	  impose	  countervailing	  measures	  against	  the	  country	  that	  created	  
them.	  
	  
On	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  spectrum,	  non-­‐actionable	  subsidies	  are	  specific	  types	  
of	  subsidies	  that	  are	  allowed	  by	  the	  WTO.	  The	  non-­‐actionable	  subsidies	  are	  
detailed	  in	  article	  8	  of	  the	  SCM	  Agreement,	  which	  includes	  subsidies	  for	  
research	  and	  assistance	  activities	  conducted	  by	  higher	  education	  and	  
research	  establishments,	  certain	  types	  of	  assistance	  to	  disadvantaged	  
regions,	  and	  certain	  subsidies	  for	  compliance	  with	  environmental	  
regulations.	  Finally,	  the	  actionable	  subsidies	  category	  includes	  any	  other	  
subsidies	  that	  are	  not	  considered	  “prohibited”	  or	  “non-­‐actionable”	  (under	  
articles	  3	  and	  8	  of	  the	  agreement),	  and	  that	  satisfy	  the	  following	  two	  
additional	  requirements:	  	  
	  
a. Specificity:	  An	  actionable	  subsidy	  is	  considered	  specific	  when	  the	  
eligibility	  to	  receive	  the	  benefits	  is	  limited	  to	  certain	  enterprises	  or	  
industries	  (article	  2	  of	  the	  SCM	  Agreement),	  and	  
	  
b.	   Adverse	  effect:	  An	  actionable	  subsidy	  is	  considered	  adverse	  when	  it	  
produces	  a	  serious	  prejudice	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  another	  member,	  an	  
injury	  to	  its	  domestic	  industry,	  or	  a	  nullification	  or	  impairment	  of	  
benefits	  accruing	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  to	  other	  members	  under	  the	  
GATT	  (article	  5	  of	  the	  SCM	  Agreement).	  	  	  	  
	  
When	  an	  actionable	  subsidy	  is	  specific	  and	  produces	  an	  adverse	  effect,	  the	  
affected	  countries	  are	  entitled	  to	  file	  a	  formal	  complaint	  with	  the	  WTO	  
Dispute	  Settlement	  Body,	  and	  may	  impose	  retaliatory	  sanctions	  in	  the	  event	  
that	  the	  complaint	  is	  upheld.	  	  
2
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 147 [2018]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/147
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3095349 
	  
The	  TCJA	  includes	  two	  measures	  that	  potentially	  violate	  these	  rules:	  The	  
Base	  Erosion	  Anti-­‐Abuse	  Tax,	  or	  BEAT	  (Internal	  Revenue	  Code	  (IRC)	  section	  
59A),	  which	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  imposing	  a	  hidden	  tariff,	  and	  the	  Foreign	  Derived	  
Intangible	  Income	  provision,	  or	  FDII	  (IRC	  section	  250),	  which	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  
an	  export	  subsidy.	  
	  
2. The	  BEAT	  
	  
Under	  new	  IRC	  section	  59A,	  US	  corporate	  taxpayers	  have	  to	  pay	  a	  “base	  
erosion	  anti-­‐abuse	  tax”	  (BEAT),	  at	  10%	  less	  any	  applicable	  credits	  (including	  
the	  foreign	  tax	  credit,	  but	  the	  US	  taxpayer	  is	  unlikely	  to	  have	  them	  for	  the	  
relevant	  income	  since	  any	  foreign	  tax	  is	  imposed	  on	  the	  foreign	  related	  
party).	  	  The	  tax	  base	  is	  taxable	  income	  plus	  “base	  erosion	  payments”,	  defined	  
as	  any	  amount	  paid	  or	  accrued	  by	  a	  taxpayer	  to	  a	  foreign	  person	  that	  is	  a	  
25%	  related	  party	  of	  the	  taxpayer	  and	  with	  respect	  to	  which	  a	  deduction	  is	  
allowable,	  including	  interest	  (to	  the	  extent	  not	  otherwise	  disallowed)	  and,	  for	  
inverted	  corporations,	  also	  cost	  of	  goods	  sold.	  The	  BEAT	  also	  applies	  to	  
imports	  of	  depreciable	  property.	  Withholding	  taxes	  (if	  any)	  are	  allowed	  as	  an	  
offset.	  There	  is	  a	  safe	  harbor	  for	  smaller	  corporations	  with	  gross	  receipts	  
below	  $500	  million	  and	  another	  for	  base	  erosion	  payments	  of	  less	  than	  3%	  of	  
gross	  income.	  The	  proposal	  applies	  to	  base	  erosion	  payments	  paid	  or	  accrued	  
in	  taxable	  years	  beginning	  after	  December	  31,	  2017.	  
	  
The	  BEAT	  was	  enacted	  to	  address	  concerns	  about	  deductible	  payments	  to	  
related	  parties	  being	  used	  to	  erode	  the	  US	  corporate	  tax	  base.	  This	  concern	  
originally	  applied	  primarily	  in	  the	  context	  of	  inversions,	  because	  a	  major	  
reason	  for	  inversions	  was	  that	  following	  the	  inversion	  (i.e.,	  making	  the	  US	  
parent	  a	  subsidiary	  of	  new	  foreign	  parent)	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  load	  up	  the	  US	  
parent	  with	  debt,	  generating	  deductible	  interest	  payments	  to	  new	  foreign	  
parent	  in	  a	  low-­‐tax	  jurisdiction.	  But	  the	  BEAT	  is	  broader	  than	  this,	  applying	  
not	  only	  to	  payments	  to	  foreign	  parents	  but	  also	  to	  payments	  to	  foreign	  
subsidiaries.	  
	  
The	  BEAT	  was	  enacted	  in	  lieu	  of	  a	  much	  broader	  House	  provision	  that	  would	  
have	  applied	  a	  20%	  excise	  tax	  to	  all	  deductible	  payments	  to	  foreign	  related	  
parties	  including	  cost	  of	  goods	  sold.	  Such	  a	  provision	  would	  have	  been	  a	  
probable	  violation	  of	  the	  anti-­‐tariff	  rule	  of	  GATT	  II:1(b)	  (because	  it	  is	  an	  
unscheduled	  charge	  on	  importation	  of	  goods)	  and	  of	  the	  non-­‐discrimination	  
provision	  of	  GATT	  III:2	  (because	  it	  only	  applies	  to	  payments	  to	  foreign	  
parties).	  
	  
The	  BEAT	  is	  much	  narrower,	  and	  most	  of	  it	  applies	  to	  interest	  and	  royalties,	  
which	  are	  not	  covered	  by	  GATT.	  There	  are	  two	  provisions	  that	  can	  
potentially	  violate	  the	  GATT	  rules,	  but	  neither	  of	  them	  is	  likely	  to	  occur	  
frequently	  in	  practice.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  imposition	  of	  BEAT	  on	  the	  import	  of	  
3
Avi-Yonah:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2018
depreciable	  property.	  Since	  this	  does	  not	  include	  inventory	  or	  parts	  (which	  
are	  not	  depreciable),	  it	  would	  seem	  unlikely	  that	  it	  would	  be	  imposed	  
frequently	  enough	  to	  warrant	  a	  WTO	  challenge,	  because	  the	  scope	  of	  
permitted	  countervailing	  measures	  would	  be	  quite	  limited.	  	  
	  
The	  second	  and	  potentially	  more	  troubling	  aspect	  of	  BEAT	  is	  its	  imposition	  
on	  cost	  of	  goods	  sold	  in	  the	  context	  of	  inversions.	  This	  can	  be	  quite	  broad	  and	  
lead	  to	  a	  WTO	  violation.	  However,	  the	  provision	  only	  applies	  to	  post	  
November	  2017	  inversions	  that	  qualify	  as	  such	  under	  the	  definitions	  of	  IRC	  
section	  7874,	  and	  no	  inversion	  after	  section	  7874	  was	  enacted	  in	  2004	  has	  
qualified	  as	  such	  because	  the	  7874	  definition	  is	  relatively	  easy	  to	  avoid	  (ad	  
was	  left	  unchanged	  by	  TCJA).	  This,	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  the	  BEAT	  would	  
actually	  ever	  apply	  to	  cost	  of	  goods	  sold	  in	  practice.	  
	  
3. The	  FDII	  
	  
TCJA	  and	  new	  IRC	  sections	  951A	  and	  250	  provide	  that	  a	  10.5%	  tax	  will	  apply	  
to	  the	  foreign	  income	  of	  subsidiaries	  of	  US	  multinationals	  (CFCs)	  if	  it	  exceeds	  
a	  10%	  rate	  of	  return	  on	  their	  tangible	  assets.	  	  Because	  this	  rate	  is	  lower	  than	  
the	  new	  US	  corporate	  rate	  of	  21%	  and	  because	  there	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  tax	  
imposed	  on	  dividends	  from	  CFCs	  to	  their	  US	  parents,	  a	  concern	  arose	  that	  
there	  will	  be	  increased	  incentive	  to	  shift	  income	  from	  the	  US	  parents	  to	  CFCs	  
in	  lower	  tax	  jurisdictions.	  	  
	  
To	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  shifting	  income	  from	  the	  US	  to	  CFCs,	  new	  IRC	  
section	  250	  applies	  a	  reduced	  13.125%	  to	  “foreign	  derived	  intangible	  
income”	  (FDII)	  which	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  amount	  which	  bears	  the	  same	  ratio	  to	  
the	  corporation’s	  “deemed	  intangible	  income”	  as	  its	  “foreign-­‐derived	  
deduction	  eligible	  income”	  bears	  to	  its	  “deduction	  eligible	  income.”	  	  
	  
Deemed	  intangible	  income	  is	  the	  excess	  of	  a	  domestic	  corporation’s	  
deduction	  eligible	  income	  (gross	  income	  without	  regard	  to	  certain	  
enumerated	  categories)	  over	  its	  deemed	  tangible	  income	  return	  (10%	  of	  its	  
tangible	  assets).	  	  
	  
The	  “foreign-­‐derived	  deduction	  eligible	  income”	  is	  defined	  as	  income	  derived	  
in	  connection	  with	  (1)	  property	  that	  is	  sold	  by	  the	  taxpayer	  to	  any	  foreign	  
person	  for	  a	  foreign	  use	  or	  (2)	  services	  to	  any	  foreign	  person	  or	  with	  respect	  
to	  foreign	  property.	  In	  other	  words,	  this	  category	  comprises	  exports	  for	  
property	  and	  services,	  including	  royalties	  from	  the	  licensing	  of	  intangibles.	  	  
	  
Deduction	  eligible	  income	  is	  essentially	  the	  domestic	  corporation’s	  modified	  
gross	  income.	  So	  a	  U.S.	  company’s	  foreign	  derived	  intangible	  income,	  which	  
gets	  the	  13.125%	  rate,	  is	  the	  amount	  that	  bears	  the	  same	  ratio	  to	  the	  deemed	  
intangible	  income	  as	  the	  U.S.	  company’s	  exports	  bear	  to	  its	  modified	  gross	  
income.	  
4
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While	  services	  are	  excluded	  from	  the	  SCM,	  the	  FDII	  provision	  clearly	  applies	  
a	  lower	  rate	  (13.125%	  instead	  of	  21%)	  to	  a	  domestic	  US	  corporation’s	  sales	  
of	  goods	  to	  any	  foreign	  person	  for	  a	  foreign	  use.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  importing	  
goods	  and	  then	  re-­‐exporting	  them	  without	  significant	  modification	  will	  
qualify	  for	  the	  lower	  rate.2	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  exporting	  goods,	  
modifying	  them	  and	  then	  importing	  them	  to	  the	  US	  qualifies	  for	  the	  lower	  
rate.3	  	  
	  
FDII	  clearly	  involves	  the	  non-­‐collection	  or	  forgiveness	  of	  taxes	  otherwise	  
due,	  i.e.,	  a	  subsidy	  under	  the	  SCM,	  and	  the	  subsidy	  is	  likewise	  clearly	  
contingent	  in	  law	  and	  in	  fact	  upon	  export	  performance.	  Thus,	  there	  is	  little	  
doubt	  that	  the	  FDII	  provision	  is	  prohibited	  subsidy	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  SCM	  
that	  entitles	  trading	  partners	  to	  impose	  sanctions	  (unilaterally	  or	  after	  
receiving	  approval	  from	  the	  WTO’s	  Dispute	  Resolution	  Body).	  
	  
4. How	  Will	  the	  US	  Respond	  to	  Another	  WTO	  Loss?	  
	  
The	  FDII	  is	  just	  the	  latest	  in	  a	  long	  series	  of	  US	  export	  subsidies	  that	  were	  
struck	  down	  by	  the	  WTO	  and	  its	  predecessor	  the	  GATT.	  The	  first	  adverse	  
decision	  was	  a	  GATT	  panel	  that	  declared	  the	  US	  “Domestic	  International	  
Sales	  Corporation”	  (DISC)	  regime	  to	  be	  a	  prohibited	  export	  subsidy	  in	  the	  
1970s.	  The	  DISC	  regime	  was	  then	  replaced	  by	  the	  “Foreign	  Sales	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  See	  Michael	  Schler,	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Pending	  Tax	  Cuts	  and	  Jobs	  Act	  (Tax	  Forum	  
no.	  686,	  Dec.	  4,	  2017).	  	  See	  also	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  Reuven	  S.	  and	  Batchelder,	  Lily	  L.	  and	  
Fleming,	  J.	  Clifton	  and	  Gamage,	  David	  and	  Glogower,	  Ari	  D.	  and	  Hemel,	  Daniel	  Jacob	  
and	  Kamin,	  David	  and	  Kane,	  Mitchell	  and	  Kysar,	  Rebecca	  M.	  and	  Miller,	  David	  S.	  and	  
Shanske,	  Darien	  and	  Shaviro,	  Daniel	  and	  Viswanathan,	  Manoj,	  The	  Games	  They	  Will	  
Play:	  Tax	  Games,	  Roadblocks,	  and	  Glitches	  Under	  the	  New	  Legislation	  (December	  7,	  
2017).	  Available	  at	  SSRN:	  https://ssrn.com/abstract=3084187	  or	  
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3084187	  and	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  Reuven	  S.	  and	  Batchelder,	  
Lily	  L.	  and	  Fleming,	  J.	  Clifton	  and	  Gamage,	  David	  and	  Glogower,	  Ari	  D.	  and	  Hemel,	  
Daniel	  Jacob	  and	  Kamin,	  David	  and	  Kane,	  Mitchell	  and	  Kysar,	  Rebecca	  M.	  and	  Miller,	  
David	  S.	  and	  Shanske,	  Darien	  and	  Shaviro,	  Daniel	  and	  Viswanathan,	  Manoj,	  The	  
Games	  They	  Will	  Play:	  An	  Update	  on	  the	  Conference	  Committee	  Tax	  Bill	  (December	  
18,	  2017).	  Available	  at	  SSRN:	  https://ssrn.com/abstract=3089423.	  
3	  See	  Conference	  Report,	  fn.	  1522:	  “If	  property	  is	  sold	  by	  a	  taxpayer	  to	  a	  person	  who	  
is	  not	  a	  U.S.	  person,	  and	  after	  such	  sale	  the	  property	  is	  subject	  to	  manufacture,	  
assembly,	  or	  other	  processing	  (including	  the	  incorporation	  of	  such	  property,	  as	  a	  
component,	  into	  a	  second	  product	  by	  means	  of	  production,	  manufacture,	  or	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Corporation”	  (FSC)	  regime	  that	  was	  declared	  by	  the	  WTO’s	  DSB	  and	  
Appellate	  Body	  to	  be	  a	  prohibited	  export	  subsidy	  in	  the	  late	  1990s.	  FSC	  was	  
in	  turn	  replaced	  by	  the	  “Extraterritorial	  Income”	  (ETI)	  regime,	  which	  was	  in	  
turn	  declared	  to	  be	  a	  prohibited	  export	  subsidy	  in	  2004.	  This	  led	  the	  GOP-­‐
controlled	  Congress	  and	  the	  Bush	  administration	  to	  repeal	  the	  ETI	  and	  
replace	  it	  with	  a	  domestic	  manufacturing	  provision	  (IRC	  section	  199)	  that	  did	  
not	  violate	  the	  SCM	  because	  it	  was	  not	  contingent	  on	  export	  performance.	  
	  
This	  history	  was	  well	  known	  to	  the	  drafters	  of	  TCJA.	  In	  fact,	  the	  FDII	  
provision	  is	  a	  direct	  descendant	  of	  the	  “border	  adjusted	  tax”	  (BTA)	  that	  was	  
proposed	  by	  the	  House	  Republicans	  in	  2016	  and	  that	  was	  broadly	  declared	  to	  
be	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  SCM.4	  Nevertheless,	  the	  drafters	  of	  TCJA	  decided	  to	  
repeal	  IRC	  section	  199	  (which	  did	  not	  violate	  the	  SCM)	  and	  replace	  it	  with	  
the	  FDII,	  which	  (unlike,	  for	  example,	  the	  ETI)	  is	  a	  blatant	  and	  obvious	  
violation	  of	  the	  SCM.5	  	  
	  
This	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  current	  administration	  and	  the	  
Republican	  majorities	  in	  Congress	  would	  react	  to	  another	  WTO	  loss	  and	  
sanctions	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  Bush	  Administration	  and	  its	  GOP	  
Congressional	  majorities	  reacted	  in	  2004,	  i.e.,	  by	  repealing	  the	  offensive	  
provision.	  I	  believe	  the	  answer	  is	  probably	  no.	  	  	  Here	  is	  the	  reply	  to	  this	  
question	  provided	  by	  a	  senior	  GOP	  lobbyist:	  
	  
“Top	  USTR	  staff	  told	  me	  in	  March	  2017	  that	  the	  WTO	  will	  likely,	  one	  
day,	  take	  on	  the	  Trump	  administration.	  The	  implication	  was	  that	  the	  
future	  of	  the	  WTO	  would	  be	  at	  risk	  because	  the	  economic	  nationalists	  
are	  WTO	  skeptics…	  Sovereignty	  is	  a	  big	  issue	  for	  the	  administration.	  It	  
is	  also	  big	  among	  lefty	  fair	  traders.	  The	  WTO	  should	  not	  be	  able	  to	  
overrule	  US	  laws.	  
	  
Tax	  is	  something	  the	  GOP	  free	  traders	  care	  deeply	  about.	  If	  a	  country	  
took	  us	  on	  at	  the	  WTO,	  the	  GOP	  opposition	  to	  the	  WTO	  would	  grow.	  If	  
the	  WTO	  rules	  against	  us,	  the	  remedy	  is	  to	  authorize	  tariffs	  by	  the	  
petitioner	  against	  US	  goods	  or	  services	  of	  the	  petitioner’s	  choice.	  The	  
WTO	  does	  not	  directly	  change	  domestic	  US	  law	  after	  a	  ruling.	  The	  US	  
could	  simply	  pay	  those	  tariffs	  as	  it	  has	  in	  one	  or	  two	  cases	  in	  the	  past.	  
	  
Or	  the	  US	  could	  increase	  its	  challenge	  to	  the	  WTO	  in	  ways	  that	  USTR	  
Bob	  Lighthizer	  would	  likely	  be	  creative	  about.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  what	  he	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  See	  Avi-­‐Yonah	  and	  Clausing,	  Problems	  with	  Destination-­‐Based	  Corporate	  Taxes	  
and	  the	  Ryan	  Blueprint,	  8	  Columbia	  J.	  Tax	  L.	  229	  (2017).	  
5	  This	  issue	  was	  raised	  by	  Rebecca	  Kysar	  well	  before	  TCJA	  was	  enacted.	  See	  Rebecca	  




Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 147 [2018]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/147
is	  doing	  now…	  (1)	  preventing	  the	  re-­‐authorization	  of	  the	  term	  of	  a	  
WTO	  judge	  on	  grounds	  that	  he	  rules	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  doctrine	  not	  
contained	  in	  the	  WTO	  agreement,	  or	  (2)	  preventing	  the	  WTO	  
negotiation	  functions	  from	  achieving	  new	  agreements.	  
	  
The	  National	  Security	  Strategy	  released	  by	  the	  administration	  last	  
Monday	  basically	  said	  that	  liberalizing	  trade	  with	  China	  was	  a	  mistake	  
because	  the	  assumption	  that	  China	  would	  be	  more	  democratic	  and	  
capitalistic	  ended	  up	  wrong.	  	  Lighthizer	  has	  said	  that	  the	  WTO	  is	  ill-­‐
equipped	  to	  handle	  comprehensive	  state-­‐capitalism,	  and	  ill-­‐equipped	  
to	  handle	  the	  varying	  economic	  systems	  and	  development	  levels	  of	  all	  
its	  members.	  
	  
This	  is	  a	  long	  way	  of	  saying	  -­‐	  I’m	  not	  sure.	  	  But	  any	  WTO	  challenge	  
could	  threaten	  the	  existence	  or	  efficacy	  of	  the	  WTO	  because	  of	  this	  
context.	  Or	  threaten	  the	  US	  willingness	  to	  continue	  as	  a	  member.	  As	  
between	  tax	  cuts	  and	  the	  WTO,	  the	  GOP	  free	  traders	  would	  likely	  
choose	  tax	  cuts.”	  
	  
5. Conclusion	  	  
	  
If	  the	  GOP	  lobbyist	  is	  to	  be	  believed,	  a	  WTO	  challenge	  to	  the	  FDII	  could	  result	  
in	  a	  major	  clash	  between	  the	  US	  and	  the	  WTO,	  with	  potentially	  disastrous	  
consequences.	  Even	  if	  he	  is	  exaggerating,	  the	  willingness	  of	  the	  GOP	  
Congressional	  majorities	  to	  defy	  the	  WTO	  stands	  in	  stark	  opposition	  to	  the	  
way	  the	  GOP	  behaved	  in	  2004.	  This	  relatively	  obscure	  tax	  issue	  could	  have	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